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799 
THE STATE OF SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA: THE 
CENTRAL MONITORING SYSTEM’S CHILLING 
EFFECT ON SELF-EXPRESSION 
In June 2013, Edward Snowden shook the world’s confidence in 
personal privacy when he leaked top-secret information about the United 
States National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) surveillance program, 
“Prism.”1 Snowden’s leaks shattered the global perception that citizens of 
the world’s leading democracy are free from government intrusion,2 and it 
was no surprise that privacy issues took the international stage. At the time 
of Snowden’s leaks, it was little known that, across the globe in India, the 
largest democracy on the planet had had its own massive surveillance 
program in the works since 20073—a program that would rival the NSA’s. 
It would enable the Indian government to monitor in real time 900 million 
mobile and landlines and 160 million Internet users.4 Interestingly, the 
scheduled launch of India’s surveillance program in April 2013 received 
little attention from the press;5 nonetheless, its rollout was timely in light 
 
 
 1. For a detailed discussion of Snowden’s leaks and their global implications on privacy, see 
Angus West, 16 Disturbing Things Snowden Has Taught Us (So Far), GLOBALPOST (July 9, 2013, 
9:45 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/politics/130703/edward-snowden-leaks.  
  2. See Zoe Kleinman, What does Prism tell us about privacy protection?, BBC NEWS (June 10, 
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22839609; Dark Arts, Black Hats, THE ECONOMIST 
(July 31, 2013, 11:35 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/07/ 
surveillance-america-0 (“The steady drip-drop of leaks seems to be wearing down public acceptance of 
mass snooping.”).  
 3. Official documentation of the program first appeared in the Department of 
Telecommunications’ Annual Report for 2007–2008. DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
ANNUAL REPORT (2007–2008), available at http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/English%20 
annual%20report%202007-08_0.pdf (“The requirements for [the program] have been finalized . . .”). 
In the Annual Report for 2008–2009, the Department of Telecommunications stated that R&D 
activities for the project were “ongoing.” DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ANNUAL REPORT, 
available at http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/AR_English_2008-09_0.pdf). The Press 
Information Bureau publicly announced CMS in a press release on November 26, 2009. Press Release, 
Press Information Bureau, Centralised System to Monitor Communications, (Nov. 26, 2009), available 
at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ erelease.aspx?relid=54679.26. It also appeared in the 2012–2017 Report of 
the Telecom Working Group on the Telecom Sector for the Twelfth Five Year Plan. WORKING GROUP 
ON THE TELECOM SECTOR FOR THE TWELFTH FIFTH YEAR PLAN REPORT (2012–2017), available at 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/ wrkgrp12/cit/wgrep_telecom.pdf (“[the 
program’s] technology caters to the requirements of security management for law enforcement 
agencies for interception, monitoring, data analysis/mining, anti‐social‐networking using the country’s 
telecom infrastructure for unlawful activities.”).  
 4. Shalini Singh, India’s Surveillance Project May Be as Lethal as PRISM, THE HINDU (June 
21, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-surveillance-project-may-be-as-
lethal-as-prism/article4834619.ece.  
 5. Pranesh Prakash, How Surveillance Works in India, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013, 2:29 AM), 
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/how-surveillance-works-in-india/ (“When the government 
announced that the system . . . commenced in April, the news didn’t receive much attention.”). See 
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of the global conversation on government surveillance that ensued just two 
months later.  
This Note will attempt to contribute to the growing body of discussion 
on government surveillance, specifically with regard to India. This Note 
will explain why India’s surveillance program, formally called the Central 
Monitoring System (“CMS”), poses a severe threat to privacy and 
democratic free expression. More specifically, this Note will discuss how 
CMS will prompt a paradigm shift in the way speech is regulated in India 
from its current system of “private censorship” through 
telecommunications providers to a system of widespread self-censorship 
among Indian citizens whose speech is chilled by CMS. Finally, this Note 
will identify potential barriers to public debate surrounding CMS that will 
inhibit popular demand for government accountability and reform.  
I. INDIA’S CENTRAL MONITORING SYSTEM (“CMS”) & THE IT ACT 
In order to understand the impending threat to privacy at hand, one 
must first understand how CMS will operate and what it is capable of. 
CMS utilizes powerful algorithms that are capable of sifting through data 
to identify patterns and users in invasive ways.6 Once fully implemented, 
CMS will allow the government to “listen and tape phone conversations, 
read e-mails and text messages, monitor posts on Facebook, Twitter, or 
LinkedIn, and track searches on Google.”7 Essentially, every form of 
electronic communication will be under the government’s microscope. 
Even partially written emails saved in draft folders will be vulnerable to 
government intrusion.8 CMS will also enable the government to track an 
individual’s movements through the use of location-based GPS 
monitoring.9 It will be possible for the government to compile personal 
dossiers on users with the help of CMS through the collection of personal 
information that corresponds with target numbers assigned to those 
users.10  
 
 
also Anjani Trivedi, In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the Radar, TIME (June 30, 2013), 
http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-under-the-radar/. 
 6. Snehashish Ghosh, The State is Snooping: Can You Escape?, THE CENTRE FOR INTERNET & 
SOCIETY (June 27, 2013), http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-together-june-26-2013-
snehashish-ghosh-the-state-is-snooping-can-you-escape/.  
 7. Anurag Kotoky, India Sets Up Elaborate System to Tap Phone Calls, REUTERS (June 20, 
2013, 2:46 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/20/us-india-surveillance-idUSBRE95J05G2 
0130620.  
 8. Singh, supra note 4.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
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Nine government entities—including two spy agencies11—will have 
virtually unfettered access to the sensitive personal information collected 
through CMS with no court order required to monitor targets,12 no 
parliamentary oversight,13 and no formal privacy regime in place to protect 
individuals from government intrusion.14 One expert group created to 
outline principles for an Indian privacy law described CMS as “an unclear 
regulatory regime that is nontransparent, prone to misuse, and that does 
not provide remedy for aggrieved individuals.”15  
The Indian government derives its expansive power to snoop on 
citizens from the Information Technology Act (“IT Act”). Originally 
enacted in 2000, and later amended in 2008,16 the IT Act largely mirrors a 
law enacted during the colonial era,17 which permitted the government to 
 
 
 11.  The two spy agencies authorized to access surveillance data include the Intelligence Bureau 
(“IB”) and the Research Analysis Wing (“RAW”). The seven other agencies with access include the 
following: The Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”), the Narcotics Control Bureau (“NCB”), DRI, 
National Intelligence Agency, CBDT (tax authority), Military Intelligence of Assam and JK and Home 
Ministry. Id.  
 12. Unlike the NSA, which requires court approval to spy on calls or email content, CMS “will 
work without any independent oversight . . . [T]he agencies can start monitoring targets without the 
approval of the courts or the parliament.” Nandagopal J. Nair, India’s New Surveillance Network Will 
Make the NSA Green with Envy, QUARTZ (June 28, 2013), http://qz.com/99019/no-call-email-or-text-
will-be-safe-from-indias-surveillance-network/. In commenting on this lack of judicial oversight, Delhi 
University human rights professor Pawan Sinha remarked that “[b]ypassing courts is really very 
dangerous and can be easily misused.” Kotoky, supra note 7.  
 13. Parliament has played no role in the conception or execution of CMS, and it has never taken 
any affirmative action to grant the government the power it purports to have in its implementation of 
CMS. India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/india-new-monitoring-system-threatens-rights (“[T]he CMS was 
created without parliamentary approval.”). Talia Ralph & Jason Overdorf, Is India’s Government 
Becoming Big Brother?, GLOBALPOST (May 9, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/ 
news/regions/asia-pacific/india/120824/india-china-censorship-internet (“[T]his has been done with 
neither public nor parliamentary dialog.”).  
 14. Bhairav Acharya, The National Cyber Security Policy: Not a Real Policy, THE CENTRE FOR 
INTERNET & SOCIETY (Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/ blog/ 
orfonline-bhairav-acharya-observer-research-foundation-cyber-security-monitor-august-2013-nsp-not-
a-real-policy 25, 2013) (“Whereas liberal democracies around the world require such interceptions to 
be judicially sanctioned, warranted and supported by probable cause, India does not even have a 
statutory law to regulate such an enterprise.”).  
 15. India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights, supra note 13.  
 16. The earlier IT Act of 2000 made no mention of data interception or decryption as the 2008 
amended Act does; it only provided for data decryption. Additionally, the 2008 Act as amended 
broadens the scope of surveillance to include the investigation of any offense, whether cognizable or 
not. Yes, Snooping’s Allowed, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.indianexpress.com/ 
news/yes-snooping-s-allowed/419978/1.  
 17. The Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 authorizes the government to intercept communications if 
“it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the 
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement 
to the commission of an offence.” Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, No. 13 of 1885, pt. 2 § 5 INDIA CODE 
(1993), available at http://indiacode.nic.in (amended 2006). Although this Act came into existence at a 
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intercept communications in the “occurrence of public emergency, or in 
the interest of the public safety.”18 However, the IT Act “substantially 
lowers the bar for wiretapping”19 by removing the requisite preconditions 
of public emergency or public safety.20 The IT Act contains several 
provisions, discussed in later sections of this Note, that grant the central 
government complete, unfettered discretion to identify targets worthy of 
surveillance,21 to mine private data about those targets,22 and to prosecute 
them at will.23 Unsurprisingly, the IT Act raised serious concerns among 
privacy activists24 who claim it is repugnant to the Indian Constitution,25 
 
 
time when neither cell phones nor the Internet were even contemplated, it still buttresses the operation 
of CMS today. See Adrea Peterson, India’s New Surveillance Program Will Function Under a Law 
from the Colonial Era, THINK PROGRESS (July 3, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/ 
2013/07/03/2244361/india-surveillance-colonial-era/. 
 18. Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, pt.2 § 5.  
 19. Prakash, supra note 5.  
 20. Like the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, Section 69 of the IT Act provides for monitoring 
through data decryption “[i]f the Controller is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the 
interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign 
States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence.” 
Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 69(1), INDIA CODE (1993), available at http://india 
code.nic.in. However, missing from the IT Act is the introductory clause “[o]n the occurrence of any 
public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety . . . .” See id.  
 21. Id. § 69.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. § 66A.  
 24.  Public anti-CMS groups surfaced in opposition of the implementation of CMS. For example, 
the #StopICMS campaign (This site has been down for a number of months, so it may be a good idea 
to replace this group with another that has a more consistent presence on the internet) was an activist 
blog with an accompanying Twitter account aimed at educating the Indian electorate. See generally, 
http://stopicms.org. Additionally, in June of 2013 the “‘Indian wing of the hackers’ collective 
Anonymous announced a multi-city protest against what they termed ‘the Indian prism.’” Deepa 
Karup, In the Dark About “India’s Prism,” THE HINDU (June 16, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/sci-
tech/technology/in-the-dark-about-indias-prism/article4817903.ece.  
 25. Critics of the law argue that it clashes with Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which 
provides that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law.” INDIA CONST. art. 21; see, e.g., Bhairav Acharya, The Central Monitoring System: 
Some Questions to be Raised in Parliament, THE CENTRE FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/central-monitoring-system-questions-to-be-asked-in-
parliament; see also Section 66A of the IT Act Violates the Constitution of India, THE ECONOMIC 
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2012), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-07/news/ 35670648_ 
1_section-66a-annoyance-or-inconvenience-reasonable-restrictions (“Clause 2 of Article 19 of the 
Constitution makes it clear there are “reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right” granted by 
subclause A of the Article. The operative word is ‘reasonable.’”); Pranesh Prakash, Practise What You 
Preach, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.indianexpress.com/ news/practise-what-
you-preach/941491/ (“Section 69 of the IT Act allows the government to force a person to decrypt 
information, and might clash with Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which provides a right against 
self-incrimination.”). Several public interest suits have been filed challenging the constitutionality of 
the Act. In one case filed in November 2012, Shreya Singhal submitted to the Supreme Court that 
Section 66A curbs freedom of speech and expression and violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/17
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inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent,26 in violation of global 
privacy standards,27 and in contravention of international treaties to which 
India is a party.28  
Activists are particularly concerned with the government’s proclivity to 
stifle free expression under the IT Act.29 The discussion that follows will 
identify two provisions of the IT Act that threaten freedom of expression 
in India. The first of these provisions, Section 69,30 curtails speech through 
“private censorship”31 by intermediary telecommunications providers. The 
 
 
Constitution. Aparna Viswanathan, An Unreasonable Restriction, THE HINDU (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/an-unreasonable-restriction/article4432360.ece.  
 26. Chinmayi Arun, Way to Watch, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (June 26, 2013), http://www.indian 
express.com/news/way-to-watch/1133737/. In 1996, India’s own Supreme Court recognized the need 
for appropriate procedural safeguards with regard to phone tapping under the People’s Union of Civil 
Liberties v. Union of India and Another in order to ensure fairness and reasonableness of surveillance. 
The court outlined the following procedure for wiretapping: 
I. [T]he order should be issued by the relevant Home Secretary (this power is delegable to a 
Joint Secretary),  
II. the interception must be carried out exactly in terms of the order and not in excess of it, 
III. a determination of whether the information could be reasonably secured by other means, 
IV. the interception shall cease after sixty (60) day[s].  
People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Another, A.I.R. 1997 S.C.568 (India). 
Although some of these safeguards have been accounted for in the IT Act, there is no way for the 
public to ensure that they are being adequately carried out. Id. 
 27. Arun argues that, when measured against the safeguards for government surveillance 
recommended by Frank La Rue, United Nations special rapporteur for the promotion of and protection 
of free speech and expression, the CMS framework is markedly weak in terms of its protections for 
citizens. Id. La Rue’s recommendations provide that: 
[I]ndividuals should have the legal right to be notified that they have been subjected to 
surveillance or that their data has been accessed by the state; states should be transparent 
about the use and scope of communication surveillance powers, and should release figures 
about the aggregate surveillance requests, including a break-up by service provider, 
investigation and purpose; the collection of communications data by the state, must be 
monitored by an independent authority.  
Report Of The Special Rapporteur On The Promotion And Protection Of The Right To Freedom Of 
Opinion And Expression, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013).  
 28. See India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights, supra note 13. Article 17 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that, “(1) no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation; (2) everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signing Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
“Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948))) (“(1) Everyone has the right to 
own property alone as well as in association with others, ((2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his property.”).  
 29. See infra Part IV.  
 30. Information Technology Act, supra note 20, § 69.  
 31. The term “private censorship” is used throughout this Note to describe censorship conducted 
by private telecommunications companies in India rather than state actors.  
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second provision, Section 66A,32 was repeatedly used by the government 
to prosecute citizens for their expression. The Indian Supreme Court 
struck down Section 66A on March 24, 2015 declaring the law 
unconstitutionally vague and prone to arbitrary prosecution of citizens’ 
speech.33 While the Court’s decision eliminated Section 66A’s formidable 
threat to free speech, other Indian laws are still subject to prosecutorial 
abuse.34 Furthermore, the history of Section 66A is telling of the 
government’s approach to limiting free speech.  
Following the implementation of CMS, India is poised to see a marked 
shift in the way speech is regulated. The former system of “private 
censorship” will give way to arbitrary monitoring through CMS and the 
subsequent prosecution of citizens. This will have a chilling effect on the 
Indian populace. Ultimately, the implementation of CMS will lead to 
widespread self-censorship and the suppression of ideas in the 
marketplace.  
II. SECTION 69 & “PRIVATE CENSORSHIP” BY INTERMEDIARY SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 
Section 69 of the IT Act empowered the Indian central government to 
create a system of “private censorship,” whereby the Indian central 
government monitors and regulates speech through intermediary 
telecommunications service providers (“ISPs”). Under this system, the 
government issues orders to ISPs directing them to intercept data, to take 
down multimedia content, or even to block certain content altogether.35 
Section 69A grants governmental power to direct the blocking of public 
access to information through any computer resource.36 Section 69B of the 
IT Act further provides that the competent authority may “direct any 
agency . . . to intercept, monitor, or decrypt . . . any information generated, 
transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource.”37 Should any 
 
 
 32. Id. § 66A.  
 33. Amit Chaturvedi, “Unconstitutional”: Supreme Court Scraps Section 66A, Protects Online 
Freedom of Speech (Mar. 24, 2015), available at http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/freedom-of-speech-
online-section-66-a-is-struck-down-by-supreme-court-749104. Justices J. Chelameswar and Rohinton 
F. Nariman declared, “It is clear that Section 66A arbitrarily, excessively and disproportionately 
invades the right of free speech and upsets the balance between such right and the reasonable 
restrictions that may be imposed on such right.” Jayant Sriram, SC strikes down ‘draconian’ Section 
66A, The Hindu (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/supreme-court-strikes-
down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act-finds-it-unconstitutional/article7027375.ece.  
 34. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 35. IT Act §§ 69A, 69B.  
 36. Information Technology Act, § 69A.  
 37. Id. § 69B.  
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subscriber, intermediary, or person empowered to intercept the 
information “fail[] to assist the agency,” [S]ection 69 imposes a prison 
sentence of up to seven years.38 
Section 79 of the Act reinforces the system of “private censorship” by 
exposing intermediaries to liability should they refuse to do the 
government’s bidding.39 Ironically, however, Section 79 is designed to 
limit intermediary liability. Under this section, an intermediary is immune 
from liability for third party content made available or hosted by them 
provided they observe ‘due diligence’ and follow prescribed norms.40 In 
2011, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
issued a set of Rules—the Information Technology [Intermediaries 
Guidelines] Rules, also known as the 2011 IT Rules (“IT Rules”), in order 
to define and further standardize expectations for intermediaries’ 
compliance with Section 79.41 However, the 2011 IT Rules missed their 
mark because they failed to adequately define key terms in the “due 
diligence” process.42 For example, Rule 3(2) bars intermediaries from 
hosting “objectionable,” “hateful,” “disparaging,” and “defamatory” 
 
 
 38. Id. § 69. It is suggested that this penalty may well conflict with Article 20(3) of India’s 
Constitution, which provides citizens with a right against self-incrimination. This theory seems 
plausible in light of the fact that no evidence exists in the public record suggesting that the 
constitutionality of Section 69 was reviewed. Pranesh Prakash, Practise What You Preach, THE 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/practise-what-you-preach/ 
941491/.  
 39. Section 79 provides, in part, that intermediaries are not liable so long as they “observe[] due 
diligence while discharging [their] duties under this Act and also observe[] such other guidelines as 
the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf (emphasis added). Information Technology Act, 
supra note 20, § 79(2)(c).  
 40. Id. This limit on intermediary liability was introduced by the government in the 2008 
Amendments to the IT Act. Melody Patry, India: Digital Freedom Under Threat?, INDEX ON 
CENSORSHIP (Nov. 21, 2013), available at https://www.indexoncensorship.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/11/india_digital-freedom-under-threat.pdf.  
 41. Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, Gazette of India, pt.Part II, 
sec.section III (i) (Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/RNUS_ 
CyberLaw_15411.pdf [hereinafter IT Rules].  
 41. 2011 IT Rules.  
 42. Malavika Prasad, State Regulation of Social Networking Sites: Balancing Sovereignty of 
States and Free Speech, GERMAN INST. OF GLOBAL AREA STUD., 6 (2008), http://thegiga.in/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=dT3TIVzzTx8%3D&tabid=589. Even Parliament has commented on the 
amorphous language of the IT Rules. See India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights, supra note 
13: 
In March 2013, a parliamentary standing committee on the 2011 Information Technology 
rules also noted how vague and ambiguous language such as “grossly harmful,” 
“defamatory,” and “obscene” could lead to harassment. It recommended defining terms in the 
rules to ensure that no new categories of crimes or offenses were created. It also noted that 
ambiguity in the rules regarding the liability of intermediaries, such as online service 
providers, encourages them to take down any content that could run afoul of vaguely worded 
prohibitions to avoid legal penalties.  
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content.43 Yet, the Rules do not concretize any of these terms. According 
to academic Malavika Prasad, this has resulted in “the introduction of an 
element of subjectivity that renders the whole process vague and 
ambiguous . . . . Even when intermediaries believe that they may qualify 
for immunity, the uncertain application of the principles has caused them 
to err on the side of caution by blocking the content.”44  
What is more, Rule 3(4) requires that the intermediary “disable” 
infringing content within thirty-six hours of receiving notice of a 
complaint.45 Should the intermediary fail to do so, it is subject to criminal 
prosecution for any allegation flowing from the notice, and the penalty is 
harsh.46 This narrow timeframe places a heavy burden on intermediaries to 
eliminate content without sufficient time to inquire about its legitimacy.47 
The difficulty of complying with the thirty-six hour window is 
compounded by the fact that ISPs lack both legal expertise and adequate 
resources to properly address every complaint that they receive.48 The 
result is a haphazard, cursory system for reviewing complaints under 
which legitimate, lawful expression falls through the cracks.49 
 
 
 43. IT Rules at Rule 3(2).  
 44. Prasad, supra note 42, at 6–7. In 2011, the Centre for Internet and Society ran a series of tests 
to see how intermediaries responded to illegitimate takedown requests within thirty-six hours. “Of the 
7 intermediaries to which takedown notices were sent, 6 intermediaries over-complied with the 
notices, despite the apparent flaws in them . . . . The results of the [study] clearly demonstrate that the 
Rules indeed have a chilling effect on free expression.” Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: 
Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet 2011, CENTRE FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Apr. 10, 
2012), http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.  
 45. Privacy Report: India, Privacy International (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.privacy 
international.org/reports/india-0. In April 2013, the Indian government issued a Clarification on the IT 
Rules. In it, the government addressed the thirty-six hour window for takedowns, specifying that 
intermediaries need only respond or acknowledge the complaint within thirty-six hours of receiving it 
rather than actually removing the content. This did very little to alleviate the brevity of the window for 
intermediaries to comply with takedown notices. Patry, supra note 40 at 6.  
 46. Section 69A of the IT Act imposes a penalty of imprisonment for up to seven7 years for 
failing to comply with a takedown notice. Information Technology Act § 69AIT. Interestingly, though,  
[u]nauthorized access to communications data is not punishable per se . . . While there is a 
provision in the Telegraph Act to punish unlawful interception, it creates a far lesser penalty 
. . . than for a citizen’s failure to assist an agency that wishes to intercept or monitor or 
decrypt. 
Prakash, supra note 5. 
 47. “This narrow timeframe, which does not specifically take into account public holidays or 
weekends, puts intermediaries in a difficult position where they are required to be overly zealous in 
taking down content that may be entirely legitimate.” Patry, supra note 40, at 6.  
 48. “[I]t can be reasonably presumed that not all intermediaries have sufficient legal competence 
or resources to deliberate on the legality of an expression.” Dara, supra note 44, at 2.  
 49. “This overcompliance [of intermediaries] demonstrates a real chilling effect on freedom of 
expression, as many intermediaries are overwhelmed with requests or do not have the legal expertise 
to properly handle them in a manner that protects freedom of expression.” Patry, supra note 40 at 6.  
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III. OUT WITH PRIVATE CENSORSHIP, IN WITH CMS 
The system of intermediary takedowns, or “private censorship,” under 
Sections 69 and 79 is on its way out with the advent of CMS. Speech will 
be moderated largely by Indian citizens themselves rather than by ISPs. 
Fearful of a “Big Brother” government vested with the authority to 
monitor and prosecute people at will, Indian citizens will begin to self-
censor. 
In effect, the CMS scheme cuts Indian ISPs from the equation.50 The 
CMS infrastructure consolidates the existing “Lawful Interception 
Systems” installed on the network of all fixed and mobile 
telecommunications operators, ISPs, and International Long Distance 
Providers.51 Furthermore, CMS mandates the installation of additional 
dedicated interception data servers in each private telecommunications 
network for surveillance purposes.52 This creates a kind of central 
technological nervous system for government intelligence gathering in 
place of the fragmented, privatized system of the past.  
To give this system teeth, the Department of Telecommunications 
mandates service providers grant the government direct access to the 
communications they host.53 In the licenses the Department issues to them, 
providers are contractually obligated to permit governmental access to 
information, regardless of whether a warrant exists.54 Whereas before the 
government had to request that user information be monitored and turned 
over to the authorities, under CMS the Indian government can “tap into 
communications at will without telling the service providers.”55 
 
 
 50. Arun, supra note 26. Pre-CMS, the government had to request metadata from the 
telecommunication firms (e.g. call detail records, visited Web sites, IP address assignments) in order to 
supply the government with the data it sought. Prakash, supra note 5.  
 51. Singh, supra note 4.  
 52. Aman Sharma, Govt to Modernise Phone Tapping, INDIA TIMES (May 6, 2011), 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/government-plans-to-tighten-phone-tapping-norms/1/137251.html.  
 53. Prakash, supra note 5.  
 54. Id. The director general of the Cellular Operators Association of India commented that, “[w]e 
are obligated by law to give access to our networks to every legal enforcement agency.” Kotoky, supra 
note 7.  
 55. Kotoky, supra note 7. The government reasons that the updated process by which it will 
obtain information will in fact be more conducive to individual privacy, because it will reduce the risk 
of leaks and security breaches. Singh, supra note 4 (“On November 29, 2009, the government told 
Parliament that CMS’s implementation would overcome ‘the existing system’s secrecy which can [] 
easily be compromised due to manual interventions at many stages.”). Indian government officials also 
insist that since “CMS will involve an online system for filing and processing of all lawful interception 
requests, an electronic audit trail will be in place for each phone number put under surveillance.” Nair, 
supra note 12. While the Indian government insists that an audit trail will exist, the officials reviewing 
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Interception can be authorized in secret within government departments.56 
Power to approve surveillance requests by any of the nine government 
agencies with authorized access will rest in the hands of the top bureaucrat 
in the federal interior ministry and his state-level deputies.57 By 
eliminating third-party intermediaries, the government will have unfettered 
access to the communications of any individuals it wishes to target.58  
India’s new surveillance model under CMS raises a host of privacy 
concerns. With all intermediaries removed and communication 
interception solely in the hands of government officials, there is a much 
greater likelihood of “disempower[ing] citizens by relying . . . on the 
executive to safeguard individuals’ . . . rights.”59 One reporter attributed 
prevailing concerns about privacy in India to “the major technological 
advancements in monitoring and enhanced forensic capabilities in 
surveillance, coupled with the change in procedure which mandates the 
interception authorization to be kept secret between two government 
departments with no scope of a transparent public disclosure of who is 
being monitored, for what purpose and for how long, . . .”60 
Privacy advocates caution against the CMS regime on several grounds. 
For one, with the power to approve surveillance requests in the hands of 
only top-level officials, less attention will be dedicated to each individual 
surveillance request. Review of such requests will be inadequate because 
senior government officials will be inundated with interception requests 
that they have neither the time nor the manpower to evaluate.
61
 Thus, the 
risk of erroneously authorizing surveillance requests is great. To make 
matters worse, the record of surveillance authorizations will be accessible 
only internally within the government. Where requests are improperly 
granted, the public has no way of knowing about them, let alone 
 
 
it will be the same individuals issuing the orders in the first place. This is “[h]ardly a reassuring 
safeguard.” Id.  
 56. Kotoky, supra note 7.  
 57. Id. 
 58.  The new, streamlined CMS system was summarized by Maria Xynou at The Centre for 
Internet & Society as follows: 
Without any manual intervention from telecom service providers, the CMS will equip 
government agencies with Direct Electronic Provisioning, filters and alerts on the target 
numbers. . . . Essentially, the CMS will be converging all interception lines at one location 
and Indian law enforcement agencies will have access to them. 
Maria Xynou, India’s ‘Big Brother’: The Central Monitoring System (CMS), THE CENTRE FOR 
INTERNET & SOCIETY (Apr. 8, 2013), http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indias-big-brother-
the-central-monitoring-system.  
 59. Arun, supra note 26, at 2. 
 60. Singh, supra note 4.  
 61. Id.  
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challenging them. The Indian government insists that an audit trail will 
exist; however, the officials reviewing it will be the same individuals 
issuing the orders in the first place.62 Understandably, this is “[h]ardly a 
reassuring safeguard”63 for Indian citizens. 
IV. STIFLING SPEECH UNDER SECTION 66A 
The threat CMS poses to privacy was even more worrying when 
considered in conjunction with the threat to free speech posed by IT Act 
Section 66A.64 That section proscribed the sending of “offensive messages 
through communication service, etc.”65 Where the penetrating lens of 
CMS can be employed to see into citizens’ private communications, 
Section 66A could be used to prosecute those communications with little 
to no legal restraint.66  
Section 66A(a) made it an offense to send any information through a 
communication service that is “grossly offensive or has menacing 
character.”67 This section was problematic in that the term “grossly 
offensive” remained undefined and could thus provide no guidance to 
citizens as to its application.68 Without notice of what constituted illegal 
conduct, compliance with Section 66A(a) became impossible. 
Furthermore, it remained unresolved whether the offensiveness of the 
communication should be adjudicated based on the person targeted by the 
communications, or by a “reasonable person,” which is crucial to its 
interpretation.69 The law was deemed “draconian” in that “the wording of 
the Section ma[de] it so vague as to be applicable to virtually anything 
 
 
 62. Nair, supra note 12.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Information Technology Act, § 66A.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Section 66A is “potentially applicable to anything said online,” creating a danger “of it being 
used both selectively and indiscriminately against individuals, groups, rights activists, journalists, 
political dissenters et al.” Section 66A of the IT Act Violates the Constitution of India, THE ECONOMIC 
TIMES (Dec. 7, 2012)), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-07/news/35670648_1_ 
section-66a-annoyance-or-inconvenience-reasonable-restrictions.  
 67. Id.  
 68. See Viswanathan, supra note 25. In striking down the law, the Indian Supreme Court 
declared that the definition of its offenses were “open-ended and undefined.” Sriram, supra note 33.  
 69. Pranesh Prakash, Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act, CENTRE FOR INTERNET & 
SOCIETY (Nov. 25, 2012), http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-
of-the-it-act: 
[T]he term “grossly offensive” will have to be read in such a heightened manner as to not 
include merely causing offence. . . . Additionally, in order to ensure constitutionality, courts 
will have to ensure that “grossly offensive” does not simply end up meaning “offensive,” and 
that the maximum punishment is not disproportionately high as it currently is. 
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anyone might find ‘grossly’ offensive or causing ‘annoyance or 
inconvenience.’”70 The section was described by lawyers as a “poor cut 
and paste job,” which “fail[ed] to define a specific category (context) as 
defined in the laws from where it [] borrowed words.”71 The vagueness of 
Section 66A’s language is comparable to that of the IT Rules, which 
 
 
 70. Section 66A of IT Act Violates the Constitution of India, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-07/news/35670648_1_section-66a-annoyance-or-
inconvenience-reasonable-restrictions.  
 71. See G.S. Mudur, 66A “Cut and Paste Job,” THE TELEGRAPH, (December 3, 2012), 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp. The Central Government 
defends Section 66A of the IT Act on grounds that it is derived from Section 127 of the U.K. 
Communications Act, which makes criminal the sending of “matter that is grossly offensive or of an 
indecent, obscene or menacing character.” Communications Act of 2003 § 127. Importantly though, in 
Britain, unlike in India, the House of Lords has laid out a seminal test for “grossly offensive.”. The test 
takes into account societal viewpoints and “all relevant circumstances.” Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Collins, [2006] UKHL 40 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060719/collin-1.htm. The court observed, “[T]here can be no yardstick of 
gross offensiveness otherwise than by the application of reasonably enlightened, but not perfectionist, 
contemporary standards to the particular message sent in its particular context.” Id. Critics of Section 
66A urge that the provision should be “read down” in the same way in order to ensure that its 
application in India is kosher. Aparna Viswanathan urges: 
Instead of defending Section 66A on the grounds that it has been copied from U.K. 
legislation, the Union Government should take inspiration from the House of Lords’ view 
about what is ‘grossly offensive.’ This is the standard that should be have been incorporated 
in the advisory issued by the Department of Electronics and IT. 
Viswanathan, supra note 25. The language of 66A was also taken in part from Britain’s Malicious 
Communications Act of 1988, intended to prevent the sending of malicious messages outside the scope 
of online communications, and the United States’ Telecommunications Act of 1996. The following 
image provides a visual depiction of the legal language from which Section 66A was crafted:  
 
Id. 
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prohibit the hosting of “objectionable,” “hateful,” “disparaging,” and 
“defamatory” content72 without defining those terms. The difference is 
that, unlike the IT Rules, which apply to ISPs, Section 66A applied 
directly to Indian citizens.73 It could be used to target individuals for their 
speech rather than telecom corporations, which was a much greater threat 
to civil liberties.74  
Section 66A(b) criminalized the sending through a computer resource 
or communication device (1) communication known to be false (2) for the 
purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, 
injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will (3) communicated 
persistently.75 The most obvious flaw in this provision resided in the 
second criteria, which acted as a catch-all for criminalizing all manner of 
communications.76 The broad ambit of proscribed communication was of 
concern because it grouped together seemingly trivial communications 
causing “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” or “insult” with much more 
serious “injury,” “danger,” and “criminal intimidation.”77 The fact that 
results as trivial as “annoyance” or “inconvenience” were criminalized in 
the first place was troubling.78 
The government used Section 66A to silence dissent on the Internet on 
numerous occasions. Individuals were arrested for their critical political 
 
 
 72. 2011 IT Rule 3(2). 
 73. The text of Section 66A provides that the law applies to “any person” who sends proscribed 
content. IT Act § 66A.  
 74. citation 
 75. Information Technology Act, supra note 20, at § 66A(b).  
 76. Pranesh Prakash, Indian Surveillance Laws & Practices Far Worse than U.S., The Economic 
Times (June 13, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-13/news/39952596_1_ 
nsa-india-us-homeland-security-dialogue-national-security-letters.  
 77. For a more detailed argument regarding the unconstitutionally broad nature of $ 66A(b)(2), 
see Prakash, supra note 5. Prakash comments specifically that, 
That a lawmaker could feel that punishment for purposes this disparate belonged together in a 
single clause is quite astounding and without parallel (except in the rest of the IT Act). That’s 
akin to having a single provision providing equal punishment for calling someone a moron 
(“insult”) and threatening to kill someone (“criminal intimidation”).  
Id. 
 78. Id. Viswanathan’s critique of Section 66A(b)(2) includes the following: 
Surely it cannot be a legitimate legislative objective to restrict freedom of speech in order to 
prevent annoyance or inconvenience? Can a democratic society criminalise the causing of 
annoyance, inconvenience, insult or ill will? Causing insult or ill will or enmity could be a 
criminal offence if it amounts to defamation. However, insulting someone or causing 
someone inconvenience per se cannot surely be a crime in itself either in the real or virtual 
world.  
Viswanathan, supra note 25.  
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speech on social media,79 and mobile phones and social media sites were 
shut down to prevent communal riots.80 India’s paternalistic approach to 
monitoring citizens’ online activity was also apparent in the number of 
requests it submitted to Google for user data81 and for removal of 
content.82 An anonymous press release claimed, “We know the 
 
 
 79. Human Rights Watch provides a brief history of arrests made for political speech on social 
media sites: 
In April 2012, a university professor was arrested in West Bengal for circulating an email 
with pictures that poked fun at the state’s chief minister. In September, police in Mumbai 
arrested a political cartoonist, Aseem Trivedi, for his work focusing on political corruption. In 
October, police in Ponducherry arrested a businessman for posting messages on Twitter 
questioning the wealth amassed by the son of the country’s finance minister. 
In November, two girls were arrested in Maharashtra for a post on Facebook questioning the 
shutdown of their city following the death of a powerful political leader. Following the girls’ 
arrest, the central government issued an advisory to all state governments requiring prior 
approval from senior police officers for all arrests under Section 66A. In May 2013, the 
Supreme Court directed all states to carry out the government’s advisory, making it 
mandatory for police to seek clearance from high-ranking officials. 
India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights, supra note 13.  
 80. In 2012, the government asked social media sites, including Facebook and Google, to block 
links to “inflammatory content” following a riot in Mumbai that was incited by doctored images 
showing violence against Muslims and false reports of more violence to cause mass panic. Working 
with government to remove inflammatory content: Google, Facebook, INDIA TIMES (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Working-with-government-to-remove-inflammatory-content-
Google-Facebook/articleshow/15589923.cms.  
 The Indian government claimed to have already blocked 250 websites with the controversial 
videos and images. Rama Lakshmi, India blocks more than 250 Web sites for inciting hate, panic, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/india-blocks-more-than-250-web-
sites-for-inciting-hate-panic/2012/08/20/aee0b846-eadf-11e1-866f-60a00f604425_story.html.  
 In addition, it sought to have 16 Twitter handles blocked, including “several that resemble the official 
account of the prime minister’s office, including obvious parody accounts, as well as the handles of at 
least two journalists and right-wing opponents of the ruling Congress Party, such as Pravin Togadia of 
the far right Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).” Talia Ralph & Jason Overdorf, Is India’s Government 
Becoming Big Brother?, GLOBAL POST (May 9, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/ 
regions/asia-pacific/india/120824/india-china-censorship-internet. Kanchan Gpupta, a right leaning 
journalist, commented: 
I don’t think that the government has been particularly happy with the fact that somebody 
who [does not] endorse this government’s policies, its performance, and the manner in which 
this government has carried out its constitutional responsibilities [has gained an internet 
following], and they were just looking for an opportunity to sort of try and shut my voice 
down. 
Id.  
 81. “In 2012, India sent in 4,750 requests to Google Inc. for user data, the highest in the world 
after the United States.” Kotoky, supra note 7. This number was up 52% from two years ago. Trivedi, 
supra note 5.  
 82. See Pranesh Prakash, Invisible Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being 
Seen, THE CENTRE FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY (Dec. 14, 2011), http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/ 
invisible-censorship. 
[O]ut of the 358 items requested to be removed from January 2011 to June 2011 from Google 
service by the Indian government (including state governments), only 8 were for hate speech 
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government today hates [the] public criticizing it,” citing the recent arrests 
of people for tweeting or posting on Facebook as proof.83 Additionally, 
reports have shown that one of India’s clandestine organizations, National 
Technical Research Organizations (“NTRO”) has exceeded its scope. The 
NTRO has tried to crack into the servers of Google and Skype and was 
recently accused of accessing government officials’ emails without 
permission.84  
India’s Telecom Ministry attempted to curb criticism of Section 66A 
by issuing guidelines for its implementation. These required the approval 
of police officers ranked inspector general or higher in order to register 
complaints and require service providers to restrict content that is “grossly 
harmful,” “disparaging,” “harmful to minors in any way,” or that 
“threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security, or sovereignty of India.”85 
While many activists welcomed the new guidelines,86 they were 
inconsequential absent amendment of the Act itself because they were 
non-binding.87 If the Indian government were truly committed to reform, it 
would have amended the law before it was struck down.  
Section 66A was a dangerous companion to CMS because it granted 
the government legal authority to prosecute those citizens that it snoops on 
with little to no restraint.88 Not only can the central government see 
 
 
and only 1 was for national security. Instead, 255 items (71 per cent of all requests) were 
asked to be removed for “government criticism.” 
Id. 
 83. Everything You Need to Know About Indian Central Monitoring System (ICMS), Anon 
Insiders (May 5, 2013), https://anoninsiders.net/everything-you-need-to-know-about-icms-1956/. 
 84.  84. See Pranesh Prakash, Indian Surveillance Laws & Practices Far Worse than U.S., THE 
ECONOMIC TIMES (June 13, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-13/news/ 
39952596_1_nsa-india-us-homeland-security-dialogue-national-security-letters, stating: 
Recent reports reveal India’s secretive National Technical Research Organization--, created 
under an executive order and not accountable to Parliament--, often goes beyond its mandate 
and, in 2006-2007, tried to crack into Google and Skype servers, but failed. It succeeded in 
cracking Rediffmail and Sify servers, and more recently was accused by the Department of 
Electronics and IT in a report on unauthorized access to government officials’ emails.  
 85. Advisory on Implementation of 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, DEPARTMENT 
OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 9, 2013).  
 86. Panesh Prakash, one of the most prominent critics of CMS and the IT Act, said “I think this 
is a great step forward. . . There is still a lot to be done, but for now I am content with the 
government’s decision of wanting to monitor the situation on the ground.” Preetika Rana & Margherita 
Stancati, India Tightens Rules on Hate Speech Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/11/29/india-tightens-rules-on-hate-speech-law/. The leader of 
the New Delhi-based Internet Democracy Project also welcomed the guidelines, but not without 
reservation. She claimed that she would press for changing the wording of the Act if the guidelines fail 
to make a significant impact. Id.  
 87. Id. (“‘Without the law being amended these cosmetic changes are of no consequence,’ argues 
Pavan Duggal, a Delhi-based lawyer and cybercrime expert.”).  
 88. See supra note 39.  
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directly into the private communications of its citizens, it could use 
Section 66A to prosecute any communications that it does not approve 
of.89 Section 66A is no longer in effect, but certain provisions of the Indian 
Penal Code still have the potential to curb free speech.90 If past 
enforcement of Section 66A is any indication of the government’s future 
practices, then lawful speech could easily be arbitrarily prosecuted moving 
forward using those penal code provisions.91 Speech need not even be 
public now to prompt government prosecution. For example, the central 
government now has the capability to tease out a target individual’s 
private email drafts; if it disapproves of the email content, it can pursue 
the individual for a communication that was never even sent.92 Where 
Section 66A was once used to prosecute communications posted on social 
media, it can now be employed to reach the most private of exchanges.93 
Where the government once censored only public-facing or publicly 
accessible communications through ISPs using Section 69, it can now 
 
 
 89. Already, India has increasingly employed Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or 
“SLAPP suits,” to chill contrary opinions of citizens. Ujwala Uppaluri, On the Unfortunate Rise of the 
Indian SLAPP suit, THE FREE SPEECH INITIATIVE (May 24, 2013), available at http://thefsi 
india.wordpress.com/2013/05/24/on-the-unfortunate-rise-of-the-indian-slapp-suit/. Uppaluri describes 
SLAPP suits as having three primary features:  
First, there is always, and necessarily, a power imbalance between the parties in such cases: 
the plaintiff or complainant will always have greater and often disproportionately greater 
access to the resources necessary to enter and sustain a litigation, in addition to social, 
political or corporate power. . . .  
Second, there is always one object: to intimidate a target into silence or apology by way of 
legal action or the threat of it. . . .  
Third, SLAPP suits are always characterized by a flimsy, frivolous or even non-existent cause 
of action. 
Id.  
 90. One advocate told the Economic Times, “[w]hile 66A was trying to cover defamation, it can 
still be done through civil law.” Legal experts have mixed responses over abolition of Section 66A, 
THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Mar. 15, 2015), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-03-
25/news/60475374_1_section-66a-bengaluru-social-media. In particular, Sections 153 and 505 of the 
Indian Penal Code can still be used prosecute citizens for their online posts. Section 66A quashed: 
Citizens can still be arrested for online posts, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 25, 2015), 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Section-66A-quashed-Citizens-can-still-be-arrested-for-online-
posts/articleshow/46683200.cms. Section 153 allows for prosecution of a person who makes a 
statement, either orally or in writing, that incites communal riots or provokes communal tension. Id. 
Violations are punishable by 6 months to one year in prison. Id. Section 505 proscribes the spreading 
of a rumor causing public disorder. Id. The penalty for Section 505 is up to three years of 
imprisonment. Id.  
 91. In fact, these Indian Penal Code provisions were invoked along with Section 66A in order to 
make arrests for offensive posts. Id.  
 92. This is a hypothetical I created to illustrate my point. But if you’re looking for authority to 
support the government’s ability to access private email drafts, then: See supra note 8 and 
accompanying text.  
 93. See supra Part I.  
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access even private speech.94 As a result, a “chilling effect” on free speech 
will take hold in India under which citizens self-censor their private 
communications for fear of possible government reprisal.  
V. THE “CHILLING EFFECT” IMPOSED BY CMS & SECTION 66A 
“A chilling effect occurs where one is deterred from undertaking a 
certain action X as a result of some possible consequence Y.”95 The 
doctrine of the “chilling effect” is employed by jurisdictions having 
constitutional cultures of free speech and association,96 and it applies to 
cases where “governmental laws and governmental (or private) activities 
are of a nature that—while not directly censoring free speech—
nonetheless have the impact of self-censorship.”97 The classic example of 
the chilling effect can be observed in “excessively worded libel laws” like 
Section 66A of the IT Act. “[I]n order to keep on the right side of the law, 
citizens will end up refraining from engaging in completely legal and 
legitimate forms of speech.”98 Although CMS surveillance does not 
directly regulate or impede the freedom of expression or association, 
Section 66A was “a classic case of a law that would exercise a deeply 
chilling effect on free expression.”99  
Empirical evidence demonstrates that government surveillance 
programs like CMS and libel laws like Section 66A have a measurable 
chilling effect on the free expression of citizens.
100
 Research on the 
 
 
 94. Id.  
 95. Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
1473, 1481 (2013).  
 96. The ‘chilling effect’ is used routinely in the United States, Canada, South Africa and the 
ECHR, to name just four jurisdictions. The Chilling Effect in India, INDIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY BLOG (Dec. 5, 2013, 5:57 PM), http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2013/12/05/the-
chilling-effect-in-india/. Doctrinally, the chilling effect in the context of free speech has received very 
little recognition in India. It has been acknowledged in a few Delhi High Court cases and scattered 
observations have been made by the Madras and Karnataka High Courts; however, the phrase has most 
often arisen in other contexts such as rent control. Id. It is unclear why the doctrine has not taken root 
in India, because even India’s southern neighbor Sri Lanka has acknowledged its significance. Id. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. One survey showed that, post September 11, 2001, some Muslim Americans who believed 
they were being monitored by the U.S. government actually modified their Internet usage to avoid the 
government’s intelligence programs (by either reducing or eliminating their Internet usage). Dawinder 
S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of Internet by Muslim 
Americans, 7 U. MD. L. J. RACE RELIG. Gender & Class 375, 391–93 (2007). Another study 
demonstrated markedly less defamatory content in Australia—a democratic nation— compared with 
Malaysia and Singapore, where speech in news is constrained by the government, demonstrating the 
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psychological effects of widespread government surveillance has shown 
subjects to be “self-conscious and fearful,” and such apprehension 
manifests in a culture of self-censorship.101 In speaking on the 
psychological effects of surveillance, philosopher Sandro Gaycken posited 
that “[T]here are well-established psychological consequences to being 
watched. . . . People change, tailoring their behavior to fit what they 
believe the observer wants.”102 
The public continually witnessed the government’s abuse of Section 
66A to prosecute speech, and it may well see further abuses of the Indian 
Penal Code to the same end. As citizens learn that the government has 
real-time access to their phone calls, web browsing, and social media 
activity, intimidation will develop amongst the masses. Predictably, a 
culture of self-censorship will pervade. The public will become reluctant 
to disseminate ideas that may elicit disapproval from the central 
government, even if such ideas are legitimate, and even if those legitimate 
ideas are disseminated between private parties. This is because, under 
CMS, privacy in communications is a thing of the past. Citizens are 
exposed to the risk of being monitored each time they send an email, post 
content on social media, or make a phone call.103 Such a risk may well 
outweigh the value of self-expression for many Indian citizens, who will 
cease to express their thoughts and opinions in order to avoid being 
targeted. In short, in the context of free speech and association, CMS will 
“stabilize[] totalitarianism, and destabilize[] democracy.”104 
VI. CMS WITHOUT PUBLIC REDRESS: BARRIERS TO PUBLIC OPPOSITION  
CMS is threatening the vibrancy of free expression and eviscerating the 
right of privacy in India. Yet despite the magnitude of the rights at stake, 
much of the population in India lacks the ability to push back on the 
government by demanding transparency and accountability. Several forces 
 
 
chilling effect of restrictions on free speech. Andrew T. Kenyon, Investigating Chilling Effects: News 
Media and Public Speech in Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia, 4 INTL. J. COMM., 440 (2010).  
 101. See Jillian C. York, The Chilling Effects of Surveillance, ALJAZEERA (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/201362574347243214.html (observing the social 
toll of government surveillance in the Soviet Union or East Germany, referring to Marcus Jacob & 
Marcel Tyrell, The Legacy of Surveillance: An Explanation for Social Capital Erosion and the 
Persistent Economic Disparity Between East and West Germany (July 26, 2010)).  
 102. John Boreland, Maybe Surveillance is Bad, After All, WIRED (Aug. 8, 2007), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/08/maybe-surveilla/ (discussing a pro-privacy speech given by 
Gaycken at an International Hacker Meeting). Gaycken further argued that the tendency of 
surveillance to create a “watched and a watching class” lends itself to totalitarianism. Id.  
 103. See Kotoky, supra note 7.  
 104. Id.  
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are at work in India that impede the conversation about CMS from getting 
started, and further barriers exist to prevent that conversation from gaining 
traction. Without a conversation, there cannot be collective action. 
Without collective action, a government will not be held accountable for 
its actions.  
To begin with, the Indian public remains uninformed about CMS and 
its implications as the government’s communication about the details of 
CMS has been extremely opaque. There is no public documentation 
explaining the “functions and technical architecture” of the program,105 
and public officials have refused to provide meaningful information about 
the program.106 Government officials attempt to justify the secrecy of the 
program on grounds that public knowledge of CMS details would inhibit 
the effectiveness of the program’s intelligence gathering.107 Whatever the 
reason, Indian citizens cannot engage in meaningful conversation about a 
regime of which they are only vaguely aware. Until the government 
demonstrates more transparency, the Indian public is limited in its ability 
to advocate for enhanced privacy.108  
Even those who know about CMS have virtually no rights to notice or 
due process in order to vindicate their privacy and free speech rights. 
Under the intermediary takedown system, the IT Rules do not require 
intermediaries to notify third parties whose expression is removed or 
 
 
 105. Acharya, supra note 25 (noting that the “lack of transparency is the single-largest obstacle to 
understanding the Central Government’s motives in conceptualising and operationalizing the CMS”). 
The interception flow diagram of CMS remained under wraps as of this June. Singh, supra note 4.  
 106. Many public officials have chosen to remain anonymous when commenting about the reach 
of CMS and related privacy concerns. See, e.g., Kotoky, supra note 7 (quoting a senior 
telecommunications ministry official who is directly involved in the program’s set-up that “did not 
want to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject.”) Other officials have refused to 
comment at all. Id. (“A spokeswoman for the telecommunications ministry . . . did not respond to 
queries.”). The Central Government attempted to show some accountability by enacting the National 
Cyber Security Policy (“NCSP”) in July 2013; however, the NCSP is largely meaningless in that it 
does not even consider the effect that CMS will have on cybersecurity. See Acharya, supra note 14. In 
summarizing the problems with the NCSP, Acharya remarks,  
The NCSP’s poor drafting, meaningless provisions, deficiency of analysis and lack of stated 
measures renders it hollow. Its notification into force adds little to the public or intellectual 
debate about cybersecurity and does nothing to further the trajectory of either national 
security or democratic freedoms in India.  
Id. In a recent Google+ Hangout session, Milind Deora, India’s Minister of State for IT, stated that 
“most people may not be aware of” CMS because it’s “slightly technical.” Trivedi, supra note 5. For 
video of the full Google+ Hangout, refer to http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwTsek5WUfE. 
 107. Kotoky, supra note 7.  
 108. Cynthia Wong, Internet researcher at Human Rights Watch, insisted that “[i]f India doesn’t 
want to look like an authoritarian regime, it needs to be transparent about who will be authorized to 
collect data, what data will be collected, how it will be used, and how the right to privacy will be 
protected.” India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights, supra note 13. 
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blocked, nor do they require intermediaries to provide any explanation for 
declining or accepting takedown requests.109 The situation can only 
worsen with the implementation of CMS, which completely removes 
intermediaries from the equation.110 The government is not required to 
disclose any information about whom it is monitoring, so it will continue 
to deprive citizens of notice that their communications are being 
scrutinized.111 Under CMS, the Indian public will remain in the dark about 
censorship activities and a buffer will no longer exist between the 
government and private communications. With no notice and even less 
procedural protection than before, citizens will find it nearly impossible to 
challenge the central government’s invasive surveillance practices.  
To make matters worse, the government has crippled organizations 
capable of educating Indian citizens about CMS and lobbying against it. 
The government recently clamped down on non-governmental agencies 
(“NGOs”) receiving foreign funding,112 posing a serious threat to the free 
speech and privacy movements in India.113 Without funding from 
democratic nations that hold free expression in high regard, NGOs in India 
cannot operate to champion such democratic ideals on the ground. Without 
the support of these NGOs, Indian citizens lack a vehicle for advocacy. 
Most will either be unable or unwilling to speak out against CMS as 
individuals for fear of criminal prosecution.  
In addition to regulatory barriers, several societal impediments in India 
obstruct public debate about CMS. For one, the lack of infrastructure and 
extreme poverty in India prevent millions from accessing digital forums 
 
 
 109. Dara, supra note 44 (“[T]he Rules are procedurally flawed as they ignore all elements of 
natural justice. . . . The Rules in their current form clearly tilt the takedown mechanism in favour of the 
complainant and adversely against the creator of expression.”).  
 110. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
 111. India: Big Brother up and running, ENEMIES OF THE INTERNET, available at 
http://12mars.rsf.org/2014-en/2014/03/10/india-big-brother-up-and-running/.  
 112. See Rama Lakshmi, Activists bristle as India cracks down on foreign funding of NGOs, 
WASHINGTON POST (May 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/activists-
bristle-as-india-cracks-down-on-foreign-funding-of-ngos/2013/05/19/a647ff80-bcaf-11e2-b537-ab47 
f0325f7c_story.html. The Indian government suspended the permission that Indian Social Action 
Forum (INSAF), a network of more than 700 NGOs across India receiving over 90% of its funding 
from foreign sources, had to receive foreign funds. “Anil Chaudhary, who heads an NGO that trains 
activists and is part of the INSAF network” stated, “The government’s action is aimed at curbing our 
democratic right to dissent and disagree.” Id. “The United States is the top donor nation to Indian 
NGOs . . . with Indian NGOs receiving funds from both the U.S. government and private U.S. 
institutions.” Id. “In the year ending in March 2011 . . . about 22,000 NGOs received a total of more 
than $2 billion from abroad, of which $650 million came from the United States.” Id.  
 113. NGOs as civil society groups “‘are among the essential building blocks of any healthy 
democracy.’” Id. (quoting a United States State Department spokesman). By crippling them, the 
central government necessarily weakens democratic lobbying.  
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where public debate takes place. Only 12.6% of the Indian population has 
access to the Internet,114 and only 3% of all households in India had a fixed 
Internet connection in 2012.115 The extremely low level of Internet 
penetration can be explained in part by the following: lack of Internet 
infrastructure (i.e. few servers, low levels of PC ownership, lack of 
reliable electricity), extreme poverty in rural areas, and relatively high 
costs for broadband connections.116 For most Indian citizens, Internet 
accessibility is only made available through cybercafés; however, the 
government imposed onerous regulations on cybercafés under the IT 
Rules117 that stunt the growth of cybercafé facilities118 and effectively 
restrict citizens’ use of public Internet facilities.119 Without access to the 
 
 
 114. Patry, supra note 40, at 17.  
 115. Id. “Only 2% of rural India has access to the web, according to the Internet and Mobile 
Association of India (IAMAI). That’s a small percentage when you think that more than 70% of the 
population lives outside an urban conurbation.” Rajini Vaidyanathan, Is 2012 the Year for India’s 
Internet?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16354076.  
 116. CHANDRA GNANASAMNANDAM ET AL., ONLINE AND UPCOMING: THE INTERNET’S IMPACT 
ON INDIA, McKinsey & Company (Dec. 2012).  
 117. 2011 IT Rules. Privacy International has outlined the burdensome cybercafé regulations as 
follows: 
According to the new rules, cyber cafes are forbidden from allowing any user to use their 
computer resources “without the identity of the user being established.” A user may establish 
his identify by producing any of seven different identity documents including driving license, 
passport etc. The cyber cafe is required to keep either a scanned copy or photocopy of the 
identity document produced and such a copy is to be retained for a period of one year. . . . The 
cyber cafe is required to maintain a detailed log of every user that includes the user’s name, 
address, gender, contact number, type and detail of identification document, date, computer 
terminal identification, log-in time and log out time. For at least one year, the cyber cafe must 
also retain the complete history of websites accessed using computer resources at the cyber 
cafe and all logs of proxy server installed at cyber cafe. . . . The rules also stipulate the size of 
cubicles and their orientation. 
India Country Report, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.privacyinternational. 
org/reports/india-0.  
 118. See Nikhil Pawha, Reasons for the Declining Growth of Cybercafes in India, MEDIANAMA 
(July 17, 2008), http://www.medianama.com/2008/07/223-reasons-for-the-declining-growth-of-cyber 
cafes-in-india/ (discussing the various factors that impede the functioning of cybercafés, including 
numerous licensing requirements, “know your customer” norms, and police harassment, among 
others).  
 119. ‘Cybercafé’ has a very broad definition under the IT Act and means “any facility from where 
access to the internet is offered by any person in the ordinary course of business to the members of the 
public.” IT Act 2011. This can include a wide range of venues beyond traditional cybercafés, including 
airports, hotels, etc. India Country Report, supra note 117. According to Melody Patry, the cybercafé 
rules are problematic for two primary reasons:  
Firstly, they limit the creation and sustainability of cybercafés by imposing draconian 
administrative requirements. For example, cybercafés must also have the capacity to retain 
user identity information and the log register in a secure manner for a minimum period of a 
year. Secondly, the rules directly limit citizens’ access to cybercafés. Cybercafés cannot allow 
users to use computer resources without providing an established identity document, a barrier 
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Internet in the home or in public places, it is virtually impossible for 
Indian citizens to learn about, let alone participate in, the debate about free 
expression and the dangers of government surveillance. Even those with 
online access face communication barriers. “With over 30 major languages 
and 1500 dialects, India is a unique market.”120 Because there is no 
common language across India, it is difficult for Indian citizens to come 
together on free speech and privacy issues presented by CMS. 
Furthermore, most online content is English, which only 11% of the 
population can read.121 The communication gaps created by language 
barriers will no doubt impede the free flow of ideas and opinions with 
regard to government surveillance.  
An oppressive surveillance regime is taking hold in India, and yet its 
citizens have little to no power to fight it. The gravity of CMS’s evils is 
compelling, but it is more worrying that citizens have almost no recourse, 
legally or otherwise. Without the means to unify and speak out against 
state monitoring, the world’s largest democracy will devolve into the 
world’s largest surveillance state.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
With the world’s eye turned to government surveillance, there is no 
time like the present to confront the dangers of India’s “Big Brother” CMS 
regime. The sheer magnitude of the threat to privacy and free expression 
in India is evident in the numbers. According to the Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India, as of March 31, 2013 the number of telecom 
subscribers more than quadrupled from 2007, growing to 881.41 million 
total subscribers.122 India is poised to see the world’s largest incremental 
growth in Internet usage, from 330 to 370 million total users in 2015.123 
 
 
for poorer people in rural communities who are disproportionately likely not to have the 
required identification. 
Patry, supra note 40.  
 120. Shilpa Kannan, Is Language the Key to Hooking India on the Web?, BBC NEWS (July 8, 
2012)), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18735792.  
 121. Patry, supra note 40.  
 122. Up from 205.87 total subscribers in 2007, this represents a compound annual growth rate of 
43.93%. Indian Telecom Sector Growth: An International Success Story, PRESS INFORMATION 
BUREAU, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
(Dec. 23, 2011), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=79183. 
 123. Gnanasamnandam et al., supra note 116. See chart below for graphical representation of 
India’s projected growth in Internet users.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/17
  
 
 
 
 
2015] THE STATE OF SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA 821 
 
 
 
 
Even so, Internet penetration is quite low by global standards, as its 120 
million users only account for 12.6% of the total Indian population.124 It is 
shocking enough that this many telecommunications users are subject to 
government surveillance and censorship under CMS and the IT Act. But 
the number of potential users whose rights will be implicated by CMS is 
staggering. The telecommunications sector is flourishing in India like 
never before, and the central government is poised to seize it.  
Where previously the government had to depend on ISPs to monitor 
and filter content, it can now tap directly into the private communications 
of its citizens. Its surveillance capabilities under CMS, combined with its 
prosecutorial power to regulate speech, previously under the ambiguous 
Section 66A and now under the Indian Penal Code, will create a chilling 
effect on free speech in India. The Indian people will no longer 
communicate freely for fear of arbitrary criminal prosecution, and a 
system of self-censorship will emerge. Governmental, infrastructural, and 
cultural barriers will likely impede public opposition to CMS, leaving 
Indian citizens largely without redress to vindicate their civil liberties. As 
such, reform of CMS and the IT Act depends in great part on the 
conversation outside of India. The Indian central government must be held 
accountable for its surveillance practices lest the democratic culture of free 
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expression be diminished. The fate of privacy and free expression in India 
lies with international activist organizations and other democratic nations 
who will demand accountability and transparency. Otherwise, the world’s 
largest democracy could devolve into an Orwellian state. 
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